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C Y B E R   S E C T O R

# BitLocker To Go

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# Outline

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- Introduction
- While you'll see more BitLocker
- What hasn't changed
- Passwords
- Smart Cards
- Drive Layout
- BitLocker To Go
- Auto Unlock Keys
- Incident Response
- Forensics
- Operations

# Introduction

- BitLocker Disk Encryption (BDE)
  - Full Volume Encryption
  - Introduced with Windows Vista
  - Protects data at rest




Image courtesy Microsoft Corporation.

# Introduction

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- Not widely adopted
  - Only came with Enterprise or Ultimate edition
  - Pain to install
    - Required hard drive repartition
    - Easy to lose data
  - Pain to use
    - Easy to lose data

# BitLocker version 2

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
- Introduced in Windows 7 (Fall 2009)
  - Still only in higher end versions
- Asks to upgrade existing BDE volumes
- Still painful to use for fixed disks

# Why You'll See More BitLocker

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- Can encrypt removable media
  - BitLocker To Go (BTG)
  - USB drives
  - Encrypts in place
- As easy as right clicking

# Why You'll See More BitLocker



User right-clicks drive icon

# Why You'll See More BitLocker

- BitLocker policy options
  - Can be configured to only allow writes to BTG protected devices
- Force protection
- Ideal for deployed environments
  - USB sticks are lost, stolen
  - Prevent thief from accessing data





# What Hasn't Changed



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- Computationally infeasible to access protected volume without a key
  - There is no back door
- Best hope is known plaintext attack against AES-256  
(good luck!)

# What Hasn't Changed

- Data is encrypted with Full Volume Master Key (FVEK)
- FVEK is stored on disk, encrypted with Volume Master Key (VMK)
- Many copies of VMK are stored on disk, encrypted with different keys
  - TPM, Recovery, External, etc.



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AuthData PCR Config

### TPM and Startup Key

TPM SRK RSA 2048 Bit Startup Key 256 Bit



PCR Config

XOR

Intermediate Key 1 256 Bit

Intermediate Key 2 256 Bit

RSA

Volume Master Key 256 Bit

Full Volume Encryption Key 256 Bit

AES



AES

### Clear Key

Clear Key 256 Bit

### Startup Key or Recovery Key

Recovery Key 256 Bit

### Recovery Password

Key Sequence

Clear Salt 128 Bit

Encode

Key Stretch

Intermediate Key 1 256 Bit

Intermediate Key 2 256 Bit

AES

AES

AES

AES

# What Hasn't Changed

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- Logical access to a drive is not affected
  - Programs do not need to know about BitLocker to access the drive
- Physical access to volume
  - Use \\.\C: file
  - This file handle can be imaged
- Still using AES with Elephant diffuser
- BitLocker can be disabled but still encrypt the data

# What Hasn't Changed

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- For each particular key  $k$ 
  - Metadata contains copy of the VMK encrypted with that key
  - $E(\text{VMK}, k)$
- Metadata also contains copy of  $k$  encrypted with VMK
  - $E(k, \text{VMK})$
- Having one key means you can get all the keys
  - Allows user to recreate an access device
  - Allows us to create an access device, too

# What Hasn't Changed

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- Let's suppose metadata contains:
  - $E(\text{VMK}, \text{recovery password})$
  - $E(\text{recovery password}, \text{VMK})$
  
  - $E(\text{VMK}, \text{external key})$
  - $E(\text{external key}, \text{VMK})$
  
  - $E(\text{VMK}, \text{TPM key})$
  - $E(\text{TPM key}, \text{VMK})$

# Passwords

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- Volumes can be protected with a Unicode password
  - Documentation used "password" and "passphrase" interchangeably
- Policy can control complexity requirements
  - By default, must be at least eight characters
- To get key from password:
  - Hash password using SHA-256
  - Chain hash the result, with salt,  $2^{16}$  times
    - Repetitions makes brute force attacks more difficult
    - Salting impacts rainbow tables

# Smart Cards

- Volume is protected using Smart Card and PIN
  - Something you have and something you know
  - Exact method of key generation is unknown



Image courtesy U.S. Department of Defense and is public domain



# Command Line Interface

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- Passwords and Smart Cards not normally used for fixed disks
- But can be added using CLI
- `manage-bde.exe`
  - <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd875513%28WS.10%29.aspx>


# Drive Layout

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
- Version one munged NTFS header
  - From NTFS to -FVE-FS-
  - Also set offset 0x38 to point to metadata
- Version two completely replaces NTFS header
  - Still has -FVE-FS- signature, but is not a valid disk header
- Contains BitLocker GUID
  - 4967D63B-2E29- 4AD8-8399-F6A339E3D001
- Appears on disk as
  - 3b d6 67 49 29 2e d8 4a 83 99 f6 a3 39 e3 d0 01

# Version 1 Drive Layout

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# Version 2 Drive Layout



# Drive Layout

- Metadata format changed slightly
- Offset      Size      Description
- 0x00      8      Signature FVE-FS-
- 0x08      2      Unknown
- 0x0A      2      Version, must be 2
- 0x0C      2      Unknown
- 0x0E      2      Unknown
- 0x10      8      Volume size, in bytes
- 0x18      4      Unknown
- 0x1C      4      Size of volume header, in sectors
- 0x20      8      First Metadata offset
- 0x28      8      Second Metadata offset
- 0x30      8      Third Metadata offset
- 0x38      8      Offset of volume header
- 0x40      4      Metadata length
- 0x44      4      Unknown
- 0x48      4      Unknown
- 0x4C      4      Metadata length 2
- 0x50      16      Volume GUID
- 0x60      4      Next nonce
- 0x64      4      Volume algorithm
- 0x68      8      Timestamp

# BitLocker To Go

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- Right-click easy for USB devices
- Can also be enabled from Control Panel and CLI


# BitLocker To Go

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- Default protection is password or smart card
  - Can add others using CLI
  - Only one password per device, sorry
- Encrypts in place
  - Doesn't disturb underlying FAT12, FAT32, NTFS or exFAT
  - User can work during encryption
- If space available, adds FAT32 file system with 'reader' application
  - More like a 'copy' application, really
  - Takes about 5MB
  - Works on Windows XP and Vista

# BitLocker To Go Drive Layout

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# BitLocker To Go

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- When using GUI, user must create a recovery key file
  - Series of eight groups of six digits
- Saved to a file on the disk
  - Default name is GUID of the recovery key
  - Default save location is user's home directory
  - BUT! Key must be on a removable device to be used
  - Can also be typed manually

# Policy Settings

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
- Stored in Registry
- Control complexity, writing to unprotected devices
- HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\FVE

# Auto Unlock Keys

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- User can configure system to automatically unlock a volume
  - BitLocker External Key stored in registry
- HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\FveAutoUnlock\{GUID}
- Key and metadata encrypted using CryptProtectData function
  - Uses login credentials and 3DES
  - Can be decrypted on the same machine

# Auto Unlock Keys



# Auto Unlock Keys

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- Unfortunately GUIDs in the registry correspond to auto unlock keys, not the USB device itself
  - Can't correlate to list of USB devices seen by a machine

# Incident Response

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- Need the Full Volume Encryption Key
- Kept in RAM when drive unlocked
  - Capture RAM
- Search memory image for AES keys
  - See "Cold Boot" attack
  - Really searching for not AES key schedules



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# Incident Response

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- Need a physical image of the drive
- If the drive is mounted, can image decrypted drive!

# Incident Response

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- Want the auto unlock keys in the registry
- Grab contents of
  - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\FveAutoUnlock
  - Decrypt using user credentials



# Incident Response

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- Look for written down/printed out recovery key
  - Eight groups of six digits
  - Each group is a multiple of 11
- Look for Recovery key files
  - Unicode text
  - Contain string "Full recovery key identification:"
- Look for External key files
  - Should be stored on USB devices
  - .BEK extension

# Forensics

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- Look for clear key
  - Indicates BitLocker has been disabled

# Forensics

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- Password cracking
  - About 0.8 seconds per guess
  - Time spent in chain hashing
  - Makes brute force generally infeasible
- Key guessing
  - Easiest attack is against FVEK
  - Known plaintext attack against AES-256
  - $2^{128}$  possible keys, all equally likely
    - Good luck!

# Forensics

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- Try it out!
- There's a BTG protected volume in the 2010 DC3 Forensics Challenge
  - <http://dc3.mil/challenge/2010/>



Image courtesy U.S. Department of Defense and is public domain

# Interrogation

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# Forensics

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- Look for evidence of use on XP and Vista systems
  - Prefetch files for BitLockerToGo.exe

# Operations

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- Can add an access device
  - Remember, only one password per device
  - But external keys or recovery keys are fair game
- Can recreate an access device
  - Use stored copies of the VMK
- Can copy auto unlock keys from one computer to another
  - Have to be decrypted and re-encrypted

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# Questions?



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